BEIJING — China’s options to retaliate in its spiraling dispute with Washington go beyond matching U.S. tariff increases: It could target American companies and government debt.

Until now, Beijing has stuck to mirroring President Trump’s tariff threats. But its lopsided trade balance means China will run out of imports for punitive duties before Washington does.

A woman tends to a child near a promotional gimmick in the form of a bomb and the American flag outside a U.S. apparel shop in Beijing. One of China's options in a trade war is to make operating difficult for U.S. companies there. Associated Press/Ng Han Guan

Beijing has other ways to inflict pain. The Commerce Ministry said in June that it would adopt “comprehensive measures,” suggesting it might strike at a wider range of American interests. That includes possible harassment of automakers, retailers or other American companies that depend on China to drive revenue.

Other options include selling U.S. government debt or disrupting diplomatic efforts over North Korea, although those might also hurt Beijing’s interests.

On Friday, Washington imposed 25 percent tariffs on $34 billion worth of Chinese goods in response to complaints that Beijing steals or pressures U.S. companies to hand over technology. China announced retaliatory tariffs on a similar amount of U.S. goods.

With no resolution in sight, Trump has said the total amount of goods affected could exceed $500 billion, or more than China’s 2017 exports to the United States.

A look at some of China’s options:

TARGETING AMERICAN COMPANIES

China’s state-dominated and heavily regulated economy gives authorities an arsenal of tools to disrupt U.S. companies by withholding licenses or launching tax, anti-monopoly or other investigations. Also open to retaliation are services such as engineering and logistics in which the United States runs a trade surplus.

“The U.S. focus is on goods, while China could very well look at services, as well as the operation of U.S. companies in China,” said Taimur Baig, chief economist for DBS Group.

In one prominent case, U.S. chipmaker Qualcomm Inc. has waited for months for word on whether Chinese regulators will accept its proposed $44 billion acquisition of NXP Semiconductors. All other major governments have approved the deal.

China’s entirely state-controlled media have encouraged consumer boycotts against Japanese, South Korean and other products during previous disputes with those governments.

Last year, Beijing destroyed Korean retailer Lotte’s business in China after the company sold land in South Korea to the Seoul government for an anti-missile system opposed by Chinese leaders.

Beijing closed most of Lotte’s 99 supermarkets and other outlets in China. Seoul and Beijing later mended relations, but Lotte gave up and sold its China operations.

FINANCIAL LEVERAGE

Nationalists point to China’s $1.2 trillion holdings of U.S. government debt as leverage. Beijing might suffer losses if it sold enough to influence U.S. debt financing costs – but such sales might become necessary.

China’s yuan has sagged against the dollar this year, which might require the central bank to intervene in currency markets.

To get the dollars it needs, the People’s Bank of China might “become a net seller of U.S. Treasuries,” said Carl B. Weinberg of High-Frequency Economics in a report.

“Punishing the U.S. Treasury market is one of the tactics China has available to retaliate against unilateral U.S. tariffs,” he said.

DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE

Beijing can appeal for support to U.S. allies that are miffed by Trump’s “America first” approach and the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris climate pact.

Trump’s unilateral actions have allowed China to position itself as a defender of free trade despite its status as the most-closed major economy. That could help Beijing win over governments that have criticized Trump for acting outside the World Trade Organization.

“China could strike a common ground with the EU, Canada, Japan and other economies impacted by the U.S. tariffs,” Citigroup economists Li-Gang Liu, Xiaowen Jin and Xiangrong Yu said in a report.

Chinese leaders have tried, so far without success, to recruit European and other governments as allies.

More broadly, Chinese commentators have suggested Beijing also could disrupt diplomatic work over North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs or other initiatives. But political analysts say that would risk setting back work that Chinese leaders see as a priority.

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