The most obvious benefit to the five-player deal the Boston Red Sox executed with the Chicago White Sox on Wednesday was that it delivered someone who profiles as a No. 1 starter.

Garrett Crochet gives the Red Sox what they’ve lacked for a number of seasons – a pitcher in whom the team would feel confident starting a postseason series. Not since Chris Sale, pre-Tommy John, have the Red Sox had such a person in their rotation.

And given that it’s almost impossible for a team to compete for a pennant without such a piece, the Red Sox have checked a major box.

But the deal also represents something more symbolic. For the first time in a long time, the Red Sox have acted boldly. Or, in the parlance of the week, they’ve made a move that made them uncomfortable.

Last year, that was hardly the case. Trading for Tyler O’Neill and signing Lucas Giolito were decent acquisitions, but they didn’t move the needle in a dramatic way. Meanwhile, during the Chaim Bloom Era, the Red Sox were so focused on the future and stockpiling prospects that a bold stroke was almost unimaginable. They weren’t close enough to contention to justify a risky transaction. They were too busy rebuilding and accumulating to risk anything resembling a daring deal.

That’s changed with the Crochet deal.

The trade is not without its risk. Crochet has somewhat of a limited track record in the big leagues, having throw just 219 innings in the majors and having made just 32 starts. He’s also undergone Tommy John surgery. Neither his health nor future performance can be fully predicted.

But as Craig Breslow acknowledged earlier this week, teams are more equipped to project pitching outcomes than they’ve ever been. There’s plenty of data and diagnostic tools to help organizations anticipate what’s ahead, and the metrics on Crochet are off the charts.

His stuff is elite, and though it represents a relatively small sample size, so are his results to date. The Red Sox know they are getting a pitcher with an elite fastball, the ability to get swings and misses that few can match. They’re getting a 6-foot-6, 245-pound physical specimen who should be able to hold up under a big workload. He’s a quality lefty, which their rotation has lacked. And the intangibles are present, as his teammates and others in the Chicago organization can attest: He’s accountable and competitive.

All of that said, there are no guarantees. That goes double for the prospects who the Red Sox surrendered.

For the purposes of projecting, let’s focus on the top two minor leagues involved in the deal: Kyle Teel and Braden Montgomery. Teel is one of the game’s better catching prospects, and his inclusion in the deal leaves the Red Sox without a catcher-of-the-future candidate. Montgomery may have an even higher ceiling as a potential five-tool player.

But to state the obvious, the Red Sox had to be willing to give up something to get Crochet. In this case, they had a handful of others teams in competition for Crochet, and to win the bidding, they were motivated to offer the best package for the future. Even after subtracting two of the organization’s top five prospects, the Red Sox still have three other prospects ranked among the top 30 in MLB.

In fact, they’re still deep enough that, for the right return, they could move another piece from the now Big 3 and still have a well-regarded system.

Franky, how well Teel and Montgomery (and Wikelman Gonzalez and Chase Meidroth) develop should be of little consequence to the Red Sox. It’s perfectly OK if, in the aftermath of a big trade, both clubs emerge happy with the outcome. No matter how talented the prospects sent out were/are, none was going to be a No. 1 starter for the Red Sox.

Breslow chose the trade path. Had he instead gone to eight years and $218 million to outbid the Yankees for Max Fried, that, too, would have been fraught with peril. So would signing Corbin Burnes. When you’re committing nine-figure salaries to pitchers already past their 30th birthday, you’re taking on an inherent gamble.

Baseball executives face this choice: hope that players continue to perform at their previous level, or hope that players improve as much as you project you will. There are no easy paths.

The Red Sox could have remained static and hoped that someone on their staff emerged into a front-of-the-rotation type. Maybe Brayan Bello, for instance, still will. But that seems less likely to happen than for Crochet to match what he’s already done, and at 25, continue to grow. Fun fact: Crochet is actually more than a month younger than Bello.

But hoping and crossing their fingers wouldn’t have elevated the Red Sox in the American League race. Trading for a pitcher just now entering his prime offers a far better chance.

For those criticizing the organization for being too timid, too patient, that argument has been stripped away. Finally, the Red Sox acted boldly to fill their most obvious need. Regardless of what happens next year, three years from now or five, it’s hard to second-guess their willingness to take that big, uncomfortable step forward.

IT’S NATURAL THAT people want to make comparisons between Wednesday’s deal and the one that brought Sale to the Red Sox eight years ago. Both came from the Chicago White Sox. Both are left-handed. And the Red Sox gave up two elite prospects in both deals.

But the comparisons end there.

At the time of the deal for Sale, he had thrown 1,110 major league innings, compared to 219 for Crochet. Sale had finished in the top six in Cy Young Award voting five times; Crochet has yet to throw enough innings in a singe season to qualify for an ERA title.

So the comps are kind of silly. Sale was far more established, far more accomplished and far more of a sure thing. There was far less projection about what the Red Sox were getting on their end.

A far better comparison – as NBC Sports Boston’s John Tomase has noted – would be the deal for Josh Beckett after the 2005 season. Like Crochet, Beckett was 25, and like Crochet, he had about four years of service time under his belt. Still, the comparison is imperfect: Beckett had made 103 starts, many more than Crochet’s 32, and had already been a World Series hero, pitching the then-Florida Marlins to a title over the Yankees in 2003.

If Crochet has even one October as dominant as Beckett’s, the deal will be a success from Boston’s vantage point.

IF THERE IS A a major drawback to the deal before Crochet even puts on a Red Sox uniform, it’s this: it greatly upends Boston’s future catching situation.

It’s an open question how the Red Sox replenish at the position. Current starting catcher Connor Wong provides somewhat better than league average offense for the position, but he’s limited defensively, with poor pitch blocking and framing skills.

If the Red Sox need an upgrade in the next year, where will they turn? An argument could be made that finding quality catching is even more challenging than finding quality starting pitching, though plenty of teams seem to win without it.

More and more, teams seem to be satisfied with defense-first candidates who are capable of handling a staff, keeping the running game in check and pitch-blocking. Any offense teams get from the position is considered a bonus.

It may be a long way off, but following the 2027 season, the following are heading for free agency: Adley Rutschman, William Contreras and Cal Raleigh.

Internally, the only top catching prospect in the system, Johanfran Garcia, is just 20 and isn’t projected to reach the big leagues until sometime in 2028.