Donald J. Brooks is an infectious disease epidemiologist and native of Clifton, Maine. He is a consultant to the World Health Organization’s Department of Epidemic and Pandemic Management. The views expressed here are his own.

The current Ebola and hantavirus outbreaks are not the same kind of emergency. The two viruses spread differently, require different responses and pose different risks to Americans today. Together, however, they reinforce the same warning: epidemic prevention depends on layers of protection, and weakening these layers puts Americans, including Mainers, at greater risk.

These layers include the people and systems that detect, investigate and respond to outbreaks before they grow. Disease surveillance systems detect unusual illness. Laboratories confirm what is spreading. Field epidemiologists investigate cases and trace contacts. Clinicians care for patients and keep health facilities from amplifying spread. Together, these layers help us catch outbreaks early and keep them from spreading.

Each layer has gaps. A case can be missed. A laboratory can be backlogged. A warning can
come late. Epidemic prevention depends on layered protection for this reason, because no single layer can catch everything. When one layer fails, another must be positioned to stop what slips through.

The danger now is that the United States is weakening many of these layers at once in the name of “America First” pragmatism, particularly those that operate far from our shores and keep infectious threats from reaching them.

The United States has withdrawn from the World Health Organization. The current administration has dismantled USAID. Critical work at CDC has been scaled back. Politics portrays these as separate fights over sovereignty, foreign assistance and public health. They are not. They are connected decisions that weaken the same epidemic prevention system, leaving Americans more exposed when outbreaks emerge.

Before the current administration began systematically weakening the country’s epidemic prevention system, this system protected Americans repeatedly, often invisibly.

In a recent two-year period, American engagement helped contain more than 250 outbreaks, including cholera, Marburg and measles, across more than 40 countries. This was the result of a long-standing commitment to global health security, built on reliable funding, technical partnerships and international cooperation. Reversing the damage done to the system means rebuilding and recommitting to these foundations.

Reliable funding and technical partnerships are central to this task. The current Ebola outbreak illustrates why. Containing Ebola quickly requires strong surveillance to detect illness, laboratories to confirm infection and ready-to-act response teams.

Historically, American support has helped strengthen these capacities abroad. Countries can control outbreaks earlier, and Americans are safer when dangerous pathogens are stopped before they cross borders.

The benefits run in both directions. When this support becomes unstable, however, these systems lose the continuity they need to function optimally, and Americans lose part of the protection they provide.

American leadership in international cooperation is central to this task too. The United States has given up its seat at the tables where the world coordinates against infectious disease threats, most notably at the WHO. Both the hantavirus and Ebola outbreaks have required countries to identify exposed people, coordinate surveillance and response and align public health guidance.

Recently at the World Health Assembly in Geneva, countries gathered to do just this. The United States was absent, however. Without American leadership in these rooms, decisions that affect American safety are made without American influence.

Mainers should not assume this is only a national debate. We may live in a small state far from the current outbreaks, but we remain connected to the world through travel, commerce and migration.

Maine, like every state, is better protected when threats are found early, stopped close to their source, and met by strong public health systems at home. When the federal government dismantles the systems that keep outbreaks contained, Maine is less protected too.

Protecting Americans from infectious threats requires more than saying America comes first. It requires funding that keeps outbreak systems ready, partnerships that help stop pathogens before they travel and U.S. leadership where countries coordinate.

For Maine and the country, safety depends on staying engaged, not pretending we can stand apart from the world.